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Abstract A fuzzy set theoretic approach for handling preference uncertainty within the paradigm of the
GraphModel for Conflict Resolution is employed for systematically carrying out the strategic investigation
of a conflict over the proposed export of water in bulk quantities. Following an overview of the literature
regarding fuzzy preferences and their applications in decision making, the graph model is restructured
to incorporate fuzzy preferences into calculations of stability. Nash and sequential stability definitions,
which reflect human behavior in conflict, are modified to accommodate fuzzy preferences. The conflict
over the potential large-scale export of water from Lake Gisborne, located in Canada’s Newfoundland and
Labrador province, is modeled, assuming that one of the four Decision Makers (DMs) in the dispute has
fuzzy or uncertain preferences,while the preferences of the remainingDMs are crisp. The strategic insights
gained by varying the satisficing behavior of the DM with fuzzy preferences are discussed.
© 2011 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Decision making is one of the most common activities in
society. It ranges from simple decisions in one’s daily life to
strategic decisions in war. Depending on the number of DMs
and objectives, decision making can be categorized as:
(i) Single-participant single-objective,
(ii) Single-participant multiple-objective,
(iii) Multiple-participant single-objective,
(iv) Multiple-participant multiple-objective [1].
The last case is the most complicated, and the objective of the
present article is to suggest an appropriate solution methodol-
ogy for it, especially in caseswhere the participants orDMshave
uncertain preferences over the alternatives or states.
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problems, DMs usually have clashing interests and objectives.
Hence, strategic conflict is a common feature in these deci-
sion problems. A number of formal methodologies have been
proposed to facilitate the analysis of strategic conflicts, includ-
ing Game Theory [2], Metagame Analysis [3], Conflict Anal-
ysis [4], Drama Theory [5] and the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution [6]. These methods share many general character-
istics: they were designed to study conflict situations in which
there are at least two DMs, each of whom has multiple options
andmultiple objectives that imply distinct preferences over the
outcomes. They are either game theory or game theory variants
that have been designed to yield better decision advice or more
compelling structural insights [7]. Descriptions of a useful range
of techniques for modeling and analyzing conflict are provided
in some recently published handbooks [8–10].
Among these conflict methodologies, the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution is especially attractive because it is simple
and flexible to use. Other advantages of the graphmodel include
its ability to handle irreversible moves, model common moves,
provide a flexible framework for defining, comparing and char-
acterizing various stability definitions of human behavior under
conflict, and be easily applied to real-world disputes. The graph
model has been used for resolving conflicts arising in many dif-
ferent fields including water resources management, sustain-
able development and environmental engineering (see [11–16]
for references).
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multiple-participant dispute based on a number of stability def-
initions, describing different kinds of human behavior. Useful
stability definitions include Nash stability (R) [17,18], general
metarationality (GMR) [3], symmetricmetarationality (SMR) [3]
and sequential stability (SEQ ) [4]. In general, a state is stable for
a DM if that DM thinks that it is not advantageous for him or her
to unilaterally move away from it [6]. A stability definition ex-
plores explicitly howmoves and countermoves result in a given
state being stable or not. The key input in calculating the stabil-
ity is each DM’s preferences over the states or alternatives. At
the time of the development of the graphmodel, the preference
input consideredwas crisp, that is preferences between any two
states were expressed using the binary relations ‘‘is (strictly)
preferred to’’ and ‘‘is indifferent to’’. However, while analyzing
a real-world dispute, DMs may be unclear or uncertain about
preferences between two states, because of their cultural and
educational backgrounds, personal habits, lack of information
about the decision parameters and the inherent vagueness of
human judgment.
Until recently, only three attempts have been made to
incorporate DMs’ uncertain preferences into the Graph model
for Conflict Resolution fromdifferent points of view. Li et al. [19]
introduced a new preference structure for the graph model,
which is neither fuzzy nor probabilistic. This preference
structure includes uncertain or unknown preference in the
comparison of two states, considering a situation in which a
DM, for the time being, may be uncertain about the preference
between two states, but knows that with full information,
he or she would strictly or equally prefer one state to the
other. Then the stability definitions for R, GMR, SMR and SEQ
are modified in order to accommodate this incomplete binary
preference into the graph model structure. Ben-Haim and
Hipel [20] employed information-gap theory to ascertain how
systematic changes in preferences of DMs affect individual
stability results and equilibria. A fuzzy approach was proposed
by Al-Mutairi et al. [21] tomodel uncertainty in the preferences
of DMs involved in a conflict. The authors used five linguistic
labels: much more preferred, more preferred, indifferent, less
preferred, and much less preferred to split the fuzzy domain
of preferences. Then, adapting the concepts of strong and weak
stability proposedbyHamouda et al. [22,23], they introduced an
analogous strong andweak stability and hence strong andweak
equilibrium, to suggest possible resolutions of the dispute.
But these approaches do not accommodate uncertainty about
preferences between two states in a general sense.
A recent addition to the Graph Model for Conflict Resolu-
tion is a fuzzy preference framework developed by Bashar et al.
[24,25]. This structure accommodates DMs’ preference uncer-
tainty in the form of fuzzy preference in stability calculations. A
fuzzy preference relation is a generalized way of representing
both certain and uncertain preferences between two states or
alternatives. Within the fuzzy preference framework, four ba-
sic stability definitions are redefined as: fuzzy Nash stability or
fuzzy rationality (FR), fuzzy general metarationality (FGMR), fuzzy
symmetric metarationality (FSMR), and fuzzy sequential stability
(FSEQ) [24,25].
As explained by the authors in the book edited by Jamshidi
[26], a System of Systems (SoS) constitutes an informative
paradigm in which reality can be visualized. In fact, many au-
thors maintain that societal, technological and natural SoS are
inhabited by multiple participants or agents who compete or
cooperate with one another as they strive to achieve their goals
within and among these interconnected SoS for which unex-
pected properties and behavior emerge over time [15,27–29].Being able to model preference uncertainty via fuzzy prefer-
ences for DMs or agents participating in conflicts within these
complex adaptive SoS makes the conflict models more realis-
tic. Hence, one can argue that the original pioneering work of
Professor Lotfi Zadeh, the ‘‘Father’’ of fuzzy sets, greatly influ-
enced leading-edge research in the field of systems engineering
and many other areas.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is now
described. A brief literature review on preference uncertainty,
fuzzy preferences and their applications in various decision
making circumstances are presented in Section 2. Within
Section 3, the definitions of a fuzzy set, fuzzy number, fuzzy
relation and fuzzy preference are given. A general description
of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is presented in
Section 4, while in Section 5, the fuzzy preference framework of
the Graph Model, together with the fuzzy stability definitions,
are put forward. In Section 6, the new fuzzy graph model is
employed for formally studying strategic decisions, regarding
the dispute over the potential export of water in bulk from Lake
Gisborne, located in the Canadian Province of Newfoundland
and Labrador. Conclusions are presented in the final section of
the paper.
2. Literature review of preference uncertainty and fuzzy
preferences
Preference information is crucial for determining favored
outcomes in decision making. However, the preference can be
certain or uncertain. A certain preference is a situation in which
a DM definitely prefers one state over another or is indifferent
between them. On the other hand, an uncertain preference
is the case where a DM is not quite sure whether he or she
definitely prefers one state over another, even if he or she
picks one. Preference uncertainty is very common in real world
decision making, such as in engineering, the social sciences and
economics.
2.1. Preference uncertainty
Preference uncertainty is modeled quantitatively or qualita-
tively. Quantitatively, it is represented by numbers indicating
preference intensities [30–32] or degrees of preference [33,34];
while qualitatively, it is represented by linguistic labels, such as
good, fair and poor [35,36]. Because of its importance in vari-
ous decisionmaking techniques, uncertain preference relations
have been an active area of research, and many variants have
been developed over the last few decades.
Frequently used uncertain preference relations includemul-
tiplicative preferences [31,37], incomplete multiplicative pref-
erences [38,39], interval multiplicative preferences [40,41],
incomplete interval multiplicative preferences [42], triangular
fuzzy multiplicative preferences [43,44], incomplete triangu-
lar fuzzy multiplicative preferences [42], the fuzzy preference
relation [32–34,45,46], the incomplete fuzzy preference rela-
tion [47,48], interval fuzzy preferences [49,50], incomplete in-
terval fuzzy preferences [42], triangular fuzzy preferences [51],
incomplete triangular fuzzy preferences [42], linguistic pref-
erences [35,36] and incomplete linguistic preferences [52,53].
Among these preference relations, fuzzy preference relations
are a convenient way of representing both certain and uncer-
tain relative preferences between two states or alternatives.
A fuzzy preference between two states is represented by
a preference degree, which is interpreted as the grade or
strength of certainty of the preference of one state over another.
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preference degree is 1.0 which implies definite preference, and
the minimum preference degree is 0 which means definite
reverse preference. The preference degree 0.5 indicates that the
states, which are being compared, are likely to be indifferent.
2.2. Fuzzy preferences and their applications
Zadeh [54,55] developed fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets as effec-
tive tools for mathematically modeling uncertainty or vague-
ness. Based on Zadeh’s notion of fuzzy logic, Orlovsky [33]
proposed a fuzzy preference relation to generalize crisp prefer-
ence in a decision making situation. He introduced and studied
fuzzy preference and its properties, and the fuzzy set of non-
dominated alternatives. He established that if the fuzzy prefer-
ence relation in a fuzzy decision-making problem satisfies some
topological properties, then the problem has ‘‘un-fuzzy’’ (crisp)
non-dominated solutions.
Keeping in mind that fuzzy utilities could be a flexible way
of representing utilities of states, Nakamura [56] proposed
a method to construct a fuzzy preference, given a set of
fuzzy utilities, to allow rational decision making. Tanino [32]
discussed the use of fuzzy preference orderings in group
decision making. He defined a fuzzy preference ordering as
a fuzzy binary relation, satisficing reciprocity and max-min
transitivity, and developed group fuzzy preference orderings,
applicable when individual preferences are represented by
utility functions, developing a method for group decision
processes analogous to the extended contributive rule.
Chiclana et al. [57] introduced a general multipurpose deci-
sionmodel that is able to handle problems with a range of pref-
erence information: preference orderings, utility functions or
fuzzy preference relations. First, the preference information is
made uniform using fuzzy preference relations, and then selec-
tion processes are introduced based on the concept of fuzzyma-
jority [58] and on ordered weighted averaging operators [59].
Chiclana et al. [46] also carried out research on how to integrate
multiplicative preference relations into fuzzy multipurpose de-
cision models using preference orderings, utility functions or
fuzzy preference relations. Together with the work in [57], the
authors provided a more flexible framework to manage differ-
ent preference structures. This constituted a decision model
that approximated real decision situations involving experts
from different knowledge areas.
3. Fuzzy preferences
As mentioned above, a fuzzy preference relation models
uncertain preference in a quantitative manner. Basically, a
fuzzy preference relation is a fuzzy binary relation. This
representation is based on Zadeh’s fuzzy logic and fuzzy
sets [54,55]. Within Zadeh’s fuzzy logic concept, uncertain
preferences can also be expressed as fuzzy utilities or as
fuzzy weighted sums in a Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision Making
(FMCDM) setting. Both fuzzy utilities and fuzzy weighted sums
are essentially fuzzy numbers. There are existing techniques,
such as in [56], to calculate fuzzy preference from a given set
of fuzzy utilities or fuzzy numbers.
3.1. Fuzzy set, fuzzy number and fuzzy relation
Fuzzy Set: As is well known, the concept of a fuzzy set was
originally introduced by Zadeh [54,55] as an extension of the
classical (crisp) notion of set. Classical set theory determines themembership of elements in a set in a binarymanner: an element
either belongs to, or does not belong to, the set. However, fuzzy
set theory allows the membership of elements in a set to be
described in terms of a membership function valued in the real
unit interval [0, 1], representing the degree or grade or strength
of membership. The formal definition of a fuzzy set is given
below.
Definition 1. LetX denote a nonempty collection of objects and
I = [0, 1], a unit interval of real numbers. A fuzzy set in X is
characterized by a function δ,
δ : X −→ I, x −→ δ(x),
where δ(x) is interpreted as the ‘‘degree or grade of member-
ship’’ of x ∈ X in the fuzzy set. The nearer the value of δ(x) is
to 1, the higher is the grade of membership of x in the fuzzy set.
The function δ is called the membership function of the fuzzy
set. Note that a fuzzy set is often denoted by its membership
function.
A crisp set is a special case of a fuzzy set, in the sense
that the membership function of a crisp set can be considered
as a characteristic function that assigns a 1 for each element
belonging to the set, and a 0 for each element not belonging to
the set; so, δ is a crisp subset (or, set) if and only if δ(x) = 0 or
1, for all x ∈ X .
Fuzzy Number: A fuzzy number is a special type of fuzzy set
defined on the set of real numbers. In fact, fuzzy numbers are
regarded to be an extension of real numbers. Because of their
close association with real numbers, fuzzy numbers are able to
account for uncertainties in parameters, utilities, properties,
geometry, initial conditions and other issues. Moreover, the
basic arithmetic operations − addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation and division− allow the application areas of fuzzy num-
bers to be extended enormously [60].
Definition 2 ([60,61]). Let R denote the set of real numbers. A
fuzzy number is a fuzzy set δ : R −→ I with the following
properties:
1. δ is upper semi-continuous;
2. δ(x) = 0 outside some interval [c, d];
3. There are real numbers a, b : c ≤ a ≤ b ≤ d for which:
(i) δ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [a, b];
(ii) δ(x) is monotonic increasing on [c, a];
(iii) δ(x) is monotonic decreasing on [b, d].
Fuzzy relation: Traditionally, preference or crisp preference
is formalized using a binary relation. In consequence, fuzzy
preference is modeled using a fuzzy binary relation or simply
a fuzzy relation. A classical or crisp relation indicates that
an object, x ∈ X , is either related to, or not related to,
another object, y ∈ Y . However, a fuzzy relation describes the
uncertainty of the relationship between x and y as a degree or
grade of relationship.
Definition 3 ([60]). Let X and Y denote nonempty collections of
objects (not necessarily the same). A fuzzy relation from X to Y ,
denotedR, is a fuzzy set in X × Y with membership function:
µR : X × Y −→ [0, 1],
where µR(x, y) represents the degree, grade or strength of the
relationship of x ∈ X with y ∈ Y .
A fuzzy relation from X to Y is usually represented by a
matrix inwhich the rows and columns are labeled by the objects
of X and Y , respectively. The entries of the matrix indicate the
degree of relationship of the row object to the column object.
Note that if X = Y ,R is said to be a fuzzy relation on X or on Y .
630 K.W. Hipel et al. / Scientia Iranica, Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering 18 (2011) 627–6383.2. Fuzzy preferences
A fuzzy preference is an important type of fuzzy binary
relation. It models both the certainty and uncertainty of
preferences between two states or alternatives as a degree of
preference. A formal definition of a fuzzy preference relation is
presented below.
Definition 4 ([32,34,45,46]). Let S denote the set of m states or
alternatives: s1, s2, . . . , sm wherem > 1. A fuzzy preference over
S is a fuzzy relation on S, represented by amatrixR = (rij)m×m,
with membership function:
µR : S × S −→ [0, 1],
where µR(si, sj) = rij denotes the preference degree of state si
over sj, satisfying:
rij + rji = 1 and rii = 0.5, for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The condition rij + rji = 1 is referred to as the additive
reciprocity.
One often writes rij = r(si, sj). Interpretations of the values
of r(si, sj) are as follows:
1. r(si, sj) > 0.5 indicates that state si is likely to be preferred
to state sj; the larger r(si, sj), the more likely si is preferred
to sj; r(si, sj) = 1 means that si is definitely preferred to sj.
2. r(si, sj) = 0.5means that state si is likely to be indifferent to
state sj.
3. r(si, sj) < 0.5 indicates that state sj is likely to be preferred
to state si; the smaller r(si, sj), the more likely sj is preferred
to si; r(si, sj) = 0 indicates that sj is definitely preferred to
si.
It is important to note that the amount of preference cannot
be inferred from the degree of preference; rather, the degree
of preference is the level of certainty that a DM will prefer one
state to the other, but implies nothing about how great this
preference is likely to be.
Thus, when si is definitely preferred to sj by a DM, it means
that it is certain that si is preferred to sj, but there is no
implication as to how much more preferred si is than sj by the
DM.
4. The graph model for conflict resolution
4.1. Structure of a graph model
A graphmodel of a conflict is a set of directed graphs, one for
each DM, in which the states are nodes and the DMs’ possible
moves in one step are the directed arcs. The common vertices
within all DMs’ graphs are the feasible states.
Suppose that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of DMs and S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sm} is the set of feasible states. Dk = (S, Ak) is DM
k’s directed graph where Ak is DM k’s set of directed arcs. If %k
represents DM k’s preferences over S, then a graph model can
be given mathematically as:
{(Dk,%k) : k ∈ N}.
A directed arc is represented as an ordered pair of states, say
(si, sj), where si is the tail and sj is the head of the arc. DM, k,
controlsmoves according to the directed arcs in Ak. Graphically,
the direction of the move from one state to another is shown
using directional arrows. Note that the moves may or may not
be reversible, and that there may also be common moves [6].4.2. Unilateral moves
To permit the analysis within a graph model, it is necessary
to identify states to which a DM can unilaterally move from a
given state. The reachable list, or the set of moveable states for
a DM from a specified starting state, is a record of all the states
that the DM can reach in one step. Formally, the reachable list
from state s ∈ S for DM k is defined as:
Rk(s) = {si ∈ S : (s, si) ∈ Ak}.
The reachable list defined above is the set of unilateral moves
under the control of DM k. However, the graphmodel considers
moves and countermoves in its stability calculations. When
there are more than two DMs in the graph model, the
countermoves are performed by more than one DM. Hence the
definition of unilateral moves by a group or coalition of DMs is
needed.
Let s ∈ S and H ⊆ N , H ≠ ∅. Let RH(s) denote the set of
all states that can be reached from s through any legal sequence
of unilateral moves by some or all of the DMs in H . Note that a
sequence of moves is considered as legal if no DMmoves twice
consecutively. For any s1 ∈ RH(s), let ΩH(s, s1) denote the set
of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1.
A unilateral move from s by H is a member of RH(s) ⊆ S,
defined inductively as follows:
1. If k ∈ H and s1 ∈ Rk(s), then s1 ∈ RH(s) and k ∈ ΩH(s, s1).
2. If s1 ∈ RH(s), k ∈ H , and s2 ∈ Rk(s1), then:
(i) if |ΩH(s, s1)| = 1 and k ∉ ΩH(s, s1), then s2 ∈ RH(s) and
k ∈ ΩH(s, s2).
(ii) if |ΩH(s, s1)| > 1, then s2 ∈ RH(s) and k ∈ ΩH(s, s2).
The induction stops if no new state (s2) is added to RH(s), and if
there is no change from |ΩH(s, s1)| = 1 to |ΩH(s, s1)| > 1 for
any s1 ∈ RH(s).
Below is an algorithm to implement this definition. Let
RH(s, i) denote the set of unilateral moves from state s by
coalition H in the ith iteration, and ΩH(s, s1, i) denote the set
of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1 at the ith iteration.
Then:
1. For i = 1,
RH(s, 1) = {s1 : s1 ∈ Rk(s) for some k ∈ H}.
If s1 ∈ RH(s, 1), thenΩH(s, s1, 1) = {k : s1 ∈ Rk(s)}.
2. For i > 1,
RH(s, i) = RH(s, i− 1)
∪{s2 : s2 ∈ Rk(s1) for some s1 ∈ RH(s, i− 1),
provided |ΩH(s, s1, i− 1)| > 1
or k ∉ ΩH(s, s1, i− 1)}.
If s2 ∈ RH(s, i), then:
ΩH(s, s2, i) = ΩH(s, s2, i− 1)
∪{k : s2 ∈ Rk(s1) for some s1 ∈ RH(s, i− 1)}.
Induction stops when RH(s, i) = RH(s, i − 1) and for all s1 ∈
RH(s, i),
ΩH(s, s1, i− 1) = ΩH(s, s1, i).
5. Fuzzy preferences in the graph model for conflict
resolution
In the next subsection, a fuzzy preference structure is
presented for employment within the Graph Model for Conflict
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for Nash and sequential stability. Detailed descriptions of
the foregoing concepts, as well as the definitions for fuzzy
general metarationality and fuzzy symmetric metarationality,
are furnished by Bashar et al. [24,25].
5.1. Fuzzy preference framework within a graph model
Fuzzy relative strength of preference: Fuzzy preference cap-
tures preference uncertainty using numbers between 0 and 1,
indicating a pairwise preference degree to which one state is
preferred over the other. Fuzzy preference can be considered as
an increasing function of preference degrees for which a larger
preference degree means more likely preferred. A preference
degree of 1.0 means a definite preference. When a preference
degree is less than 1.0, it indicates that there is something that
persuades the DM that either state of the pair may be preferred
to the other, even if the DM ‘‘leans’’ towards one of the states.
Thus if r(si, sj) < 1, then there must be some reason for the DM
not to definitely prefer state si to state sj. Due to the additive
reciprocity, the number r(sj, si) = 1 − r(si, sj) can be inter-
preted as the degree to which state si is not preferred over state
sj. Hence, the concept of an uninterrupted preference intensity
of one state over another is defined below.
Definition 5. Let k ∈ N , and let rk(si, sj) denote the preference
degree of state si over sj for DM k. Then the kth DM’s fuzzy
relative strength of preference of state si over sj, denotedαk(si, sj),
is defined to be:
αk(si, sj) = rk(si, sj)− rk(sj, si).
Note that −1 ≤ αk(si, sj) ≤ 1 for any k ∈ N and i, j = 1,
2, . . . ,m. In particular:
1. αk(si, sj) = 1 indicates that DM k definitely prefers state si
to state sj.
2. αk(si, sj) = 0 means that DM k tends to be indifferent
between states si and sj.
3. αk(si, sj) = −1 indicates that DM k definitely prefers state sj
to state si.
The number αk(si, sj) measures how strongly DM k prefers
state si over state sj. Denoting αk(si, sj) = αkij for any i, j =
1, 2, . . . ,m, the kth DM’s fuzzy relative strength of preference
over S can be represented bymatrix (αkij)m×m. Keep inmind that
for any k ∈ N and any i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m:
αk(sj, si) = −αk(si, sj).
Fuzzy satisficing threshold: In a graph model, every DM has to
decide whether to stay at the current state or to move to an
advantageous state. Different DMs may have different criteria
to identify their advantageous states from a given state. In other
words, every DM in a conflict may wish to satisfy a certain level
of fuzzy relative strength of preference to decide whether to
move to a reachable state. This level of fuzzy relative strength
of preference is referred to as the fuzzy satisficing threshold of
the DM.
Definition 6. The level of fuzzy relative strength of preference
that would motivate a particular DM to move from one state to
another is called the Fuzzy Satisficing Threshold (FST) of that DM.
DM k’s fuzzy satisficing threshold is denoted by γk, or simply by
γ , if there is no confusion about which DM is being considered.
The fuzzy satisficing threshold of a DM reflects his or her
satisficing behavior in a strategic conflict. FromDefinition 5, one
can find that the fuzzy satisficing threshold of a DM is a positive
number that cannot exceed 1. That is for any k ∈ N , 0 < γk ≤ 1.Fuzzy unilateral improvements: Once the fuzzy satisficing thre-
shold of a DM is selected, the DM can identify his or her advan-
tageous states (if any) from the current state. A fuzzy unilateral
improvement from a given state, s ∈ S, for a DM, is a reach-
able state from s, such that the DM’s fuzzy relative strength of
preference of the state over s is not less than his or her fuzzy
satisficing threshold. A fuzzy unilateral improvement signals a
DM’s attractiveness to move.
Definition 7. Let s ∈ S and k ∈ N , and let γ be the fuzzy
satisficing threshold of DM k. A state si ∈ Rk(s) is called a fuzzy
unilateral improvement from s for DM k, if:
αk(si, s) ≥ γ .
Recall that Rk(s) is the set of reachable states from s for DM k.
Definition 8. The set of all fuzzy unilateral improvements from
state s for DM k is called the fuzzy unilateral improvement list
from s for DM k, and is denoted byR+k,γ (s) or simply byR+k (s).
Mathematically:R+k,γ (s) = {si ∈ Rk(s) : αk(si, s) ≥ γ }.
The Graph Model (fuzzy) stabilities reflect a DM’s unwilling-
ness to move from the current state. A DM may be indisposed
to move because the reachable states are disadvantageous, or
moving to each advantageous state leads to an unfavorable out-
come due to the responses (countermoves) by the opponents.
Note that the responses could be a unilateral move or a fuzzy
unilateral improvement. The fuzzy unilateral improvement and
fuzzy unilateral improvement list defined above are for indi-
vidual DMs. However, when the number of DMs in a conflict is
more than two, the opponents of the focal DM is a coalition or
group of two or more DMs. Therefore, it is also necessary to de-
fine fuzzy unilateral improvements from a given starting state
for a coalition or group of DMs.
Definition 9. Let s ∈ S andH ⊆ N ,H ≠ ∅. LetR+H (s) denote the
set of all fuzzy unilateral improvements from s byH , and for any
s1 ∈ R+H (s), let Ω+H (s, s1) denote the set of all last DMs in legal
sequences from s to s1. A fuzzy unilateral improvement from s by
H is a member ofR+H (s) defined inductively as follows:
1. If k ∈ H and s1 ∈R+k (s), then s1 ∈R+H (s) and k ∈ Ω+H (s, s1).
2. If s1 ∈R+H (s), k ∈ H , and s2 ∈R+k (s1), then:
(i) if |Ω+H (s, s1)| = 1 and k ∉ Ω+H (s, s1), then s2 ∈ R+H (s)
and k ∈ Ω+H (s, s2).
(ii) if |Ω+H (s, s1)| > 1, then s2 ∈R+H (s) and k ∈ Ω+H (s, s2).
The induction stops if no new state (s2) is added toR+H (s), and
if there is no change from |Ω+H (s, s1)| = 1 to |Ω+H (s, s1)| > 1
for any s1 ∈R+H (s).
5.2. Fuzzy stabilities for a graph model
The concept of fuzzy stability is incorporated into the graph
model to accommodate fuzzy preferences. Fuzzy stability im-
plies a reluctance to move from a state reflecting a particular
behavioral pattern. Keep in mind that different DMs may show
different behavioral patterns in responding to a strategic con-
flict. Rational DMs usually move and countermove according
to fuzzy unilateral improvements. Believing that most DMs are
rational, fuzzy Nash stability and fuzzy sequential stability are
considered to cover a majority of DMs’ behavioral patterns in
practical real world conflicts. Hence fuzzy Nash stability and
fuzzy sequential stability are defined below.
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s is said to be fuzzy stable, or fuzzy Nash stable, or fuzzy rational
(FR) for DM k if and only if:R+k (s) = ∅.
Under FR stability, DM k only cares about his or her own
potential fuzzy unilateral improvements, without taking into
account possible responses by the opponents. Thus state s is
FR stable for DM k if and only if DM k has no fuzzy unilateral
improvements from s.
Definition 11 (Fuzzy Sequential Stability). A state s ∈ S is said
to be fuzzy sequentially stable (FSEQ) for DM k if and only if
for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ R+N−k(s1), such that
αk(s2, s) < γk.
For FSEQ, the focal DM contemplates whether each of his or
her potential fuzzy unilateral improvements is sanctioned by
the opponents using a fuzzy unilateral improvement. If the focal
DM has no fuzzy unilateral improvements from the current
state, the state is FR stable, which implies that it is also FSEQ
stable.
Definition 12. Fuzzy Equilibrium: A state s ∈ S that is fuzzy
stable for all DMs under a specific fuzzy stability definition is
called a fuzzy equilibrium (FE) under that definition.
A fuzzy equilibrium is regarded as a possible resolution
of the conflict. Note that different DMs may have different
fuzzy satisficing thresholds in identifying their own fuzzy stable
states.
6. Application of the graph model fuzzy preference frame-
work to strategic decisions in the lake Gisbornewater export
conflict
Lake Gisborne is located near the south coast of Newfound-
land, Canada, approximately 10 kilometers upstream from the
nearest community, Grand Le Pierre, a small town. The sources
of water of the lake are mainly melted snow and rainfall. The
water supply is plentiful and pure.
In 1995, CanadaWet Incorporated, a division of theMcCurdy
Group of Companies in Newfoundland, proposed a project to
export bulk water from Lake Gisborne. The project included
the construction of a water supply intake, a pipeline and an
access road along the pipeline route, a marine loading facility
for Ultra Large Crude Carrier vessels and a bottling plant in an
accessible area close to the pipeline. Maximum water usage
was estimated to be 300,000 cubic meters per week [62]. As a
result of possible economic benefits, the Provincial Government
of Newfoundland and Labrador registered the project.
Although at the time of the request there was no policy
on bulk water exports, the provincial Department of the
Environment and Labour, in conjunction with the Departments
of Industry, Trade and Technology, and Justice, developed a
new policy which was approved by the Cabinet in September,
1996. Under this policy, there was a strong possibility that the
proposals for the exportation of water might be accepted.
The opposition and many environmental lobby groups
criticized the province’s water export policy. They argued
that the policy would take the province closer to the
export of water in bulk quantities from Lake Gisborne. The
environmentalists claimed that permitting water from Lake
Gisborne to be sold in bulk would make Canadian water a
‘‘commodity’’ which would allow any other company to bringsimilar projects under the terms and conditions of World
Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) [12]. Removal of bulk water may cause
unpredictable and harmful consequences to basin habitat,
biodiversity, shorelines, jobs and culture, particularly to First
Nations. Disregarding these environmental and other harmful
consequences, several groups supported the project, with the
hope of an economic development of job-poor Newfoundland,
especially the small community of Grand Le Pierre.
To protect its natural resources and save the basin habitat
from possible environmental disaster, the Federal Government
of Canada announced its water export policy on February 10,
1999. This policy prohibited bulk water removal from ma-
jor drainage basins in Canada. The Provincial Government of
Newfoundland and Labrador endorsed and supported a per-
manent national ban on bulk water export projects, except for
Lake Gisborne. (see Figure 1) But facing tremendous pressure
from the Federal Government and lobby groups, the Provincial
Government introduced new legislation prohibiting bulk water
removal from Newfoundland and Labrador, and consequently
the Gisborne Water Export project was stopped [63].
Early in 2001, Roger Grimes, the new Premier of Newfound-
land and Labrador, revived the Lake Gisborne water export
project, with a view to generate some badly needed cash for
the province. He initiated a review of the project and thought
that there was a good chance Newfoundland might go it alone.
But the idea drew criticism across the province from politi-
cians, environmentalists, students and others. In October 2001,
Justice Minister, Kelvin Parsons, announced that the govern-
ment would not introduce legislation to remove the ban on
bulk water exports during the upcoming session of the legis-
lature [64]. One reasonwas the lowwater price in international
markets at that time.
By studying the background and consequences of the Lake
Gisborne water export dispute, one can see that it is dynamic
in nature. The water export was an issue at different points
in time. Fang et al. [65] carried out a static analysis of the
dispute for October, 1999, using the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution. Although the water export project is currently
stopped, when the water price in the world trade market rises
so that it is possible to make high profits from water exports,
the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador may initiate a
more thorough analysis to reach another conclusion in favor
of exporting water in bulk from Lake Gisborne. Following a
summary of the study of Fang et al. [65], Hipel et al. [66]
investigated the strategic aspects of water exports from Lake
Gisborne at a future time when the price of water is high.
Table 1 represents DMs and their options in the Gisborne
conflict as of October, 1999, where the status quo situation
is shown in the right column. Here, a ‘‘Y’’ indicates that the
option against it is selected by the DM controlling it, and
‘‘N’’ means that the option is not taken. As found in [65],
the evolution of the dispute from the status quo state (s12)
to the equilibrium state (s6) is shown in Table 2. The arrows
indicate the option changes that took place to cause the
conflict to progress from one state to another. The final state
in this sequence (the equilibrium state s6) represents the
situation where the Federal Government proposed a Canada
wide accord on the prohibition of bulk water removal from lake
basins, Newfoundland Provincial Government supported a full
prohibition on bulk water removal, Canadian Support appealed
to continue the Gisborne project and the Canadian opposition
did not petition, as their major demand was satisfied. This
is what actually happened when the Gisborne water export
project was stopped.
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Decision makers Options Status quo
Federal Government (Federal) 1. Propose a Canada wide accord on prohibition of bulk water removals
(Prohibition)
Y
Provincial Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
(Provincial)
2. Full prohibition on bulk water removal from lake basins (Full) N
3. Prohibition on bulk water removal from lake basins except the Gisborne
project (Exception)
Y
Canadian Support (Support) 4. Appeal to continue Gisborne project (Continue) N5. Appeal to seek compensation (Compensation) N
Canadian Opposition (Opposition) 6. Petition for introducing new legislation to prevent water export
(Petition)
YTable 2: Evolution from the status quo state to equilibrium in the Gisborne
conflict as of October, 1999.
Decision makers
and options
Status quo
state
Intermediate
states
Equilibrium
state
Federal
1. Prohibition Y Y Y Y
Provincial
2. Full N −→ Y Y Y
3. Exception Y N N N
Support
4. Continue N N N −→ Y
5. Compensation N N N N
Opposition
6. Petition Y Y −→ N N
State s12 s10 s2 s6
The background of the Gisborne water export conflict, as
well as the evolution shown in Table 2, reveal that the Provincial
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador is the key player
in this conflict. During the evolution of the conflict, this DM
changed its strategy on a number of occasions. Moreover,
Table 2 reflects the fact that the historical result (or equilibrium)
was controlled by the Provincial Government’s strategy to
either fully prohibit the removal of bulk water from lake basins
or not.
In this paper, a fuzzy preference framework of the graph
model is employed to study the Lake Gisborne water export
conflict for a future time. The DMs and their options are con-
sidered to be the same as those utilized by Hipel et al. [66].
In particular, the DMs in this future conflict are the Federal
Government of Canada (Federal), Provincial Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador (Provincial), Canadian Support
(Support) representing the group that believes the province
would benefit fromwater exports, and the CanadianOpposition
(Opposition) standing for the group consisting of the opposi-
tions in the Parliament, environmental lobby groups and many
otherswho oppose the project. TheDMs of theGisborne conflict
in the present study, as well as in [66], are the same as in [65];
however, the DMs’ options are a little different, reflecting the
status of the dispute after October, 1999. Table 3 lists the DMs
the available movements between states by the DMs in the Gis-
borne water export conflict at some future date after October,
1999.
The study of the Gisborne water export conflict, based on a
situation in the futurewhen thewater price is high, executed by
Hipel et al. [66], identified an equilibriumor resolution different
from the one in [65]. The final equilibrium (state s10 in Tables 4
and 5) represents the situation where the Newfoundland
Provincial Government disregards the Federal Government’s
proposition to prohibit bulk water removal from basins and the
Opposition’s petition. The evolution from the status quo state
to this equilibrium is displayed in Table 5. It shows that the
Provincial Government, again, plays a key role in reaching this
equilibrium by changes in its strategy. The high water price
in the global market influences the Newfoundland Provincial
Government in ignoring the Federal Government’s decision,
which is reflected in its preferences over the feasible states. The
Provincial Government most prefers states not maintaining the
ban on bulk water removal over others (see [66] for details).
The Federal Government of Canada is the highest authority
to protect Canada’s natural resources. Therefore, at any time,
the Federal Government can compel the Provincial Government
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Decision makers Options Status quo
Federal Government of Canada (Federal) 1. Continue a Canada wide accord on prohibition of bulk water removals
(Prohibition)
Y
Provincial Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
(Provincial)
2. Maintain the ban on bulk water removal from lake basins (Maintain) Y
Canadian Support (Support) 3. Appeal for continuing the Gisborne project based on the NAFTA (Appeal) N
Canadian Opposition (Opposition) 4. Petition for prohibition on water export (Petition) NTable 4: Feasible states in the Gisborne conflict at a future date.
Federal
1. Prohibition N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Provincial
2. Maintain N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Support
3. Appeal N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
Opposition
4. Petition N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
States s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16Table 5: Evolution from the status quo state to equilibrium in the future
Gisborne conflict as studied in [66].
Decision makers
and options
Status
quo state
Intermediate states Equilibrium
state
Federal
1. Prohibition Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial
2. Maintain Y Y −→ N N N
Support
3. Appeal N −→ Y Y −→ N N
Opposition
4. Petition N N N N −→ Y
State s4 s8 s6 s2 s10
to comply with its accord on the prohibition of bulk water
export. Hence for the Newfoundland Provincial Government,
the states where the Federal Government continues a Canada
wide accord, and the Provincial Government does not maintaina ban on bulkwater removal, represent a direct conflictwith the
Federal Government. Although the Provincial Government does
not want to maintain the ban on bulk water removal, it prefers
not to be in direct conflict with the Federal Government. There-
fore, for the analysis of the conflict at any point in time after
October, 1999, the authors of this paper recognize a preference
uncertainty between some states for theNewfoundland Provin-
cial Government. For example, the Provincial Government may
not definitely prefer state s2 (which represents the Federal Gov-
ernment’s wish to continue a Canada wide accord, while the
Provincial Government does not maintain the ban on bulk wa-
ter removal) over state s4 (which represents that the Federal
Government is continuing with a Canada wide accord and the
Provincial Governmentmaintains the ban). As discussed earlier,
a fuzzy preference relationmaywell represent this type of pref-
erence.
The matrix RProvincial under Table 6 represents the fuzzy
preferences for the Newfoundland Provincial Government. AnTable 6: MatrixRProvincial: fuzzy preferences of the Newfoundland Provincial Government.
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DMs Ranking of states from most preferred on the left to least preferred on the right
Federal s4 s12 s8 s16 s10 s2 s14 s6 s3 s11 s7 s15 s9 s1 s13 s5
Support s1 s9 s2 s10 s5 s13 s6 s14 s7 s15 s8 s16 s3 s11 s4 s12
Opposition s12 s4 s8 s16 s10 s2 s14 s6 s3 s11 s15 s7 s9 s1 s13 s5Table 8: Fuzzy stability results for the future Lake Gisborne conflict.
FST States FR FSEQ
Federal Provincial Support Opposition FE Federal Provincial Support Opposition FE
s1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s5 ✓ ✓
s6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γFederal = 1.0 s7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γProvincial = 0.6 s8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γSupport = 1.0 s9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γOpposition = 1.0 s10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s11 ✓
s12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s13 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s14 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s3 ✓ ✓ ✓
s4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s5 ✓ ✓
s6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γFederal = 1.0 s7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γProvincial = 0.8 s8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γSupport = 1.0 s9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
γOpposition = 1.0 s10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s11 ✓ ✓
s12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s13 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s14 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
s16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
FST: fuzzy satisficing threshold.
FE: fuzzy equilibrium.entry inRProvincial, for instance 0.7, in the second row and fourth
column, stands for the Provincial Government’s preference
degree of state s2 over state s4. The preferences of the Federal
Government, Canadian Support and Canadian Opposition are
considered to be the same as in [66], which are given in Table 7
where the states are ranked from most to least preferred for
each of the DMs.
A fuzzy stability analysis is carried out for fuzzy Nash
stability and fuzzy sequential stability, defined in Definitions 10
and 11, respectively, the results of which are shown in Table 8.
For this analysis, two sets of fuzzy satisficing thresholds are
considered:
(i) {γFederal = 1.0, γProvincial = 0.6, γSupport = 1.0, γOpposition =
1.0},
(ii) {γFederal = 1.0, γProvincial = 0.8, γSupport = 1.0, γOpposition =
1.0}.
It can be seen that the fuzzy satisficing thresholds of theDMsare
the same, except for the Provincial Government. A (✓) in a cell in
the table indicates that the state is fuzzy stable for the indicated
DM or a fuzzy equilibrium under the indicated fuzzy stability
definition, for a particular set of fuzzy satisficing thresholds of
the DMs.Table 9: Evolution from the status quo state to fuzzy equilibrium s8 in the
future Gisborne conflict (when γProvincial = 0.8).
Decision makers
and options
Status quo state Fuzzy equilibrium state
Federal
1. Prohibition Y Y
Provincial
2. Maintain Y Y
Support
3. Appeal N −→ Y
Opposition
4. Petition N N
State s4 s8
When γProvincial = 0.6, state s10 is fuzzy equilibrium for
both FR and FSEQ. It represents the same final equilibrium as
in [66]. State s10 can be reached from the status quo, state s4, by
state transitions in the same way as shown in Table 5. In this
case, while the Federal Government continues a Canada wide
accord, the Provincial Government’s fuzzy satisficing threshold
allows some states, representing the Provincial Government’s
not maintaining the ban, to be a fuzzy unilateral improvement
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Decision makers and options Status quo state Intermediate states Fuzzy equilibrium state
Federal
1. Prohibition Y Y Y Y Y
Provincial
2. Maintain Y Y Y −→ N N
Support
3. Appeal N N −→ Y Y −→ N
Opposition
4. Petition N −→ Y Y Y Y
State s4 s12 s16 s14 s10for the Provincial Government over states maintaining the ban.
For example, state s6 is a fuzzy unilateral improvement from
state s8 for the Provincial Government. This case represents
the Newfoundland Provincial Government’s aggressiveness to
complete the Lake Gisborne water export project.
When γProvincial = 0.8, states s8 and s10 are found to be
fuzzy equilibria under both FR and FSEQ. The two evolutions
from the status quo state to fuzzy equilibria, s8 and s10, are
shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. As can be seen in
Table 10, the fuzzy equilibrium, s10, is reached from the status
quo state through an evolution path different from the one in
Table 5. This is because state s6 is no longer a (fuzzy) unilateral
improvement from state s8 for the Provincial Government.
Starting at the status quo state, s4, the Canadian Opposition
can invoke a unilateral move to state s12, by launching a
petition for prohibition on water exports. Then, the Canadian
Support can cause a unilateral move to state s16 by appealing
for continuing theGisbornewater export project. The Provincial
Government then makes a unilateral move to state s14, by
removing the ban on water exports. Finally, the Canadian
Support stops its appeal. The state transitions in Table 10
make it clear that the Newfoundland Provincial Government
may disregard the Federal Government’s proposition and the
Canadian Opposition’s petition to implement the Gisborne
water export project.
In Table 9, starting at state s4, the Canadian Support makes a
unilateral move to fuzzy equilibrium s8 by appealing for contin-
uing the Gisborne water export project. State s8 represents the
situation in which the Federal Government continues a Canada
wide accord on the prohibition of bulk water removal from
lake basins, the Newfoundland Provincial Government main-
tains the ban on bulk water removal, and the Canadian support
appeals for continuing the Gisborne water export project. This
can happen at any point in time in the future. Moreover, the
fuzzy equilibrium, s8 (in Table 9), is equivalent to the equilib-
rium state, s6 (in Table 2), as found by Fang et al. [65], based on
the conflict, as of October, 1999. It can also be seen from Table 8
that s8 is a FSEQ equilibrium when γProvincial = 0.6. This indi-
cates that the fuzzy stability analysis predicts a realistic resolu-
tion of the dispute for any future time, which the crisp analysis
fails to determine.
7. Conclusions
The fuzzy preference framework of the graph model opens
the opportunity to analyze multiple-participant multiple-
objective decision models when the DMs’ preferences are not
certain. It offers flexibility for analysts and researchers to study
conflicts in two steps:
(i) Identify uncertain preferences (if any) for a DM and model
them as a fuzzy preference relation.(ii) Choose a suitable fuzzy satisficing threshold for the DM.
The methodology also allows each DM to supply his or her
very own fuzzy satisficing threshold. This flexibility makes the
strategic investigation of a multiple-participant conflict, using
the fuzzy preference framework of the graph model, more
realistic.Moreover, an analystmay extract valuable information
by studying the change in stabilities for various fuzzy satisficing
thresholds, which may help guide the DMs toward a win-
win resolution. A fuzzy preference framework is applicable for
conflict decision making, not only for a case in which DMs
have fuzzy preferences over the states, but also when DMs have
crisp preferences over the states. In fact, crisp stabilities are
special cases of fuzzy stabilities. This significantly broadens the
applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution.
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